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State Capitol
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CHAIRM~N JACK R. FENTON:
The subject of today's hearing is
the use of pre-trial screenlng panels in medical malpractice litigation. The hearing will focus on AB 2919 by Assemblyman Leroy Greene
which would require that a medical injury claim against a physician or
surgeon be submitted to and reviewed by a three person screening panel
prior to a medical malpractice complaint being filed with the courts.

Thirty states have established screening panels which review and render non-binding decisions on the merits of medical malpractice claims prior to the action being litigated. These panels
were conceived as a method of relieving a burden on the courts by the
discouraging of the filing of frivilous suits and encouraging settlement of meritorious ones. Nevertheless the use of screening panels
remains controversial.
Today, the Comittee will receive testimony on both the positive and negative aspects of medical malpractice screening procedures
to aid us in determining whether California should also implement such
a system.
Our first witness is Assemblyman Leroy
author of AB 2919.

~reene,

who is the

ASSEMBLYMAN LEROY F. GREENE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As
you indicated, the purpose of AB 2919 was to create the malpractice
screening panels and they would have been empowered to review allegations of medical malpractice ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Excuse me, I was remiss in not introducing
the other member of the Committee who is here, Assemblywoman Jean
Moorhead from Sacramento. Go ahead, Leroy.
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE:
In any case, what we sought was to
create the malpractlce screening panels. They would have been empowered to review allegations of malpractice in an informal setting prior
to the filing of a lawsuit. The concept is that such a panel which
would be composed of, in this case, it was proposed to be a judge, an
attorney and a physician of the same specialty as the person accused
of malpractice, that they would be able to decide the issue of negligence in a fair and equitable manner and at much less cost in both time
and dollars to both parties involved. Currently, there is no mechanism for an injured party to determine if an injury is the result of
malpractice as opposed to unsatisfactory outcome of an illness or injury without going to the expense and the time involved in a civil
suit. So, the malpractice screening panel, then, would provide such
a determination as to whether in fact malpractice was involved at a
much lower cost.
It was presumed that the benefits of such panels to
physicians would be similar. An expert panel could settle the question
of negligence without the significant cost to the defendant of defending a civil suit. Under the bill that you're using as a basis of your
-1-

discussion, AB 2919, both the injured party and the physician would
retain the right to a jury trial if either party chose to appeal the
panel's decision. To keep this screening panel process from being a
meaningless exercise, AB 2919 provides that the findings of such a
panel shall be admissible at a subsequent trial and shall be treated
as expert testimony by the court.
The bill was not successful in passage so then I asked that
AB 2919 be sent to interim study because there didn't seem to be a consensus of opinion evolving as the bill was being considered. And I'm
hopeful that this hearing will produce the information necessary to
produce a consensus and either strengthen such weaknesses as perceived
in the bill or else indicate once and for all that this is somethina
that is not the suitable direction to go.
I of course think it is ~uch
a direction or I would not have put in the bill. With me today
Dr.
Marsh Steward, the immediate past president of the California Association of Obs
ians and Gynecologists. Dr. Steward is a strong
supporter of the malpractice screening panels, as is the associat
of physicians he represents. That's my opening statement, Mr. Chairman.
DR. MARSH STEWARD, JR.: As Mr. Greene said, my name is
Steward and I'm a practlclng obstetrician and gynecologist down in
Fullerton, Californ
I'm the immediate past president of the California Association of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and I'm currently
chairman of their malpractice committee. ~1edical malpractice today
still constitutes in our opinion one of the major problems facing the
medical profession. It's also in our opinion one of the factors which
is causing the cost of medical care or health care to be priced out of
the ordinary consumer. OB men are particularly interested in this aspect of medical practice because we're more like
to be sued by ten
times than any other practicing physician. We are not interested in
to reform the entire tort system. We are not interested in
ing the bas
of
jurisprudence, but we do feel that there
are some th
can be done in a small way which will improve the
performance of the system. Assemblyman Greene's bill creating prefiling screening panels is one of the things that we feel can do a
great deal.
Pre-trial screening panels or pre-filing screening panels
exist today in 29 of our states. They are mandatory in 19 of our
states. I think their goals, as Assemblyman Greene said, are relatively stra
forward.
They seek to screen out the frivolous or
the baseless suit prior to its getting into the system and clogging
it up. And they also would likely assist in the speedy resolution of
those claims which are well based or well founded. Medical practice
such a complex technical situation that very few doctors are
able to understand all of the aspects of medicine and certainly the
person,
lay individual who is involved in this process
sometimes completely at a loss. The patient who feels that she has
been
ured takes her complaint to an attorney who examines it for
ial action and he really in many cases is unable to reach a deion as to whether there is anything there or not. These pre-trial
or pre-fil
screen
panels would be a mechanism by which he could
get at least supposedly objective, unbiased, expert opinions which
would examine the facts informally and say to him, "We feel that there
is a justified cause of action here~ Or conversely, "We feel that this
is not a matter of medical negligence." I think this would accomplisp,
-2-

as I said before, the weeding out of the baseless claims which are
numerous.
The Association of Insurance Commissioners, in its study of
this problem, has indicated that the physician-defendant is winning
nine out of ten of these cases which go to trial. Now either there
are an awful lot of inept advocates or there are a lot of baseless
suits being brought. And I think that a mechanism which would help
to weed out these baseless suits would be of great advantage to both
the patient, the attorney and the physicians.

•

CHAIRMAN FENTON: Doctor, according to this bill the attorney is selected by the judge from a list submitted by the local bar.
However, if the attorney selected is a trial lawyer, we know his bent.
If the attorney selected is a defense attorney we know his bent. How
do we achieve impartiality in these proceedings? I assure you as an
attorney it's sometimes impossible to be impartial. The only one that
would be impartial, would be the judge. That part of the proposal
bothers me.
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: Well, Assemblyman Fenton, the screening
panel is a prel1minary bout to the main bout which would be a trial before the court. And what you are asking of these three people, the
judge, the physician, and the attorney, is, "Do you think that there
are proper grounds of malpractice?" And let us suppose that there is
bias on the part of one or more of those three -- and therefore you
have what might in the end prove not to be the case -- you know there's
a bias one way or the other. There then is in the bill itself a system
whereby if you don't agree within 60 days with the party, you can appeal that as well so that ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

You can appeal it?

ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: Yes, if the screening panel determines
there is no liability, that determination may be reviewed by filing a
complaint within 60 days and also the other way around. So that ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, you say the decision may be reviewed
by filing a complaint, r1ght? Let's say I have a medical malpractice
claim. We hold a hearing on my claim and you find my claim not to be
meritorious. Now what you're saying is that within 60 days of that I
have to file a normal medical malpractice lawsuit. Correct? That's
the complaint to which you're referring.
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE:
have now?

Right.

CHAIRMAN FENTON: Now, how is that different from what we
From the t1me I file my complaint, what is different?
DR. SEWARD:

There's one thing ...

CHAIRMAN FENTON: What does this opinion do other than trigger the 60 days time period?
DR. SEWARD: Well, it is also considered germane in the case
itself. That 1s, 1t is evidence as expert testimony in the very case
that is before the court. So that's one thing.
-3-

CHAIRMAN FENTON: Okay, that's where my talk about bias, unintentional b1as, bothers me.
ASSEMBLY~ffiN GREENE:
Well, whether it's intentional or unintentional b1as, you know you have that at any witness in any trial,
okay.
Intentional or unintentional bias. That possibly always exists.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:
I presume you would not allow the plaintiff's attorney to call 1n the judge, to call in the doctor and to call
in the attorney and cross-examine them on the basis of which they have
rendered their opinion.
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE:
I don't know.

I don't know the answer to that question.

DR. STEWARD: As I read the bill and as the other pre-trial
screening panels are constituted in the other states, it is not an
adversary proceeding.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: The opinion is just entered and the jury,
if you have a Jury, would be given precautionary instructions that this
is an opinion and they are to consider this as an expert opinion.
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: But I don't know why you couldn't call
them in, Jack, because the language of the bill says on page 5, line
4, the judge who is a member of the screening panel shall not preside
in the subsequent hearing or trial in the same case. Nothing says he
cannot be called as a witness. Likewise, it says on line 7, 8 and 9
on page 5 that no member of that panel shall be liable for damage for
any acts or statements made as a member of the panel but again nothing
suggests that the person can.not be called into the courtroom.
DR. STEWARD: May I just interject something there.
In answer to your quest1on about the inherent bias on the make-up of several
members of the panel, I'm sure that there would be some bias built in
as there is in any human activity, but I think there would be less bias
in the so-called impartial objective group than there would be in the
people directly involved in the case. In other words, there would be
less bias on the part of the attorney who is sitting on the panel than
there would be on the attorney representing the defendant or the attorney representing the plaintiff so that attorney might be a little less
biased.
~ith

CHAIRMAN FENTON: You're talking about degrees.
you on degrees. That's correct.

I'll agree

DR. SEWAP~: And the same is true of the physician member of
the panel.
He lS not going to be as biased as the defendant's physician. He is likely to be a little more objective.
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: You know, it appears though from the
number of the states that use such screening panels in one form or
another that there doesn't seem to have been too much concern or problem with the bias that you are suggesting because of the great number
of states that use
. What you're starting with is an over-all thing
here that actually goes back to insurance and insurance claims, malpractice insurance. What you have is something that is extremely expensive and you recall of course as well as anybody, Assemblyman
-4-

Fenton, what happened a few years ago when it hit the fan over the malpractice business of physicians.
So that what we're saying is okay,
you do have a number of cases that are frivolous suits. How do you
weed them out, decrease the cost of malpractice insurance and attempt
at the same time to unclog some of the court calendars and the likes?
Well, this simply says, "All right, why don't you take your first shot
here." And if these people, if they have some bias or not, it seems
to me that they still expect to have reasonable people here to that are
simply being asked, "Hey, is there some merit to this claim?"
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, you have to understnad, Leroy, that
without the opportun1ty to cross-examine, you're now going to allow
this in as expert testimony. Normally you are allowed to crossexamine, the people who are giving &xpert testimony.

•

ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: Again, I see nothing in the bill that
prevents that.
If you could show me anything that prevents that I'd
like to see what it is.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, you are permitting the opinion in.
If I call a doctor, I have to call him in as my witness.
In this bill
you allow the opinion to go in period as expert testimony.
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE:
I know but there's nothing to prevent
you from call1ng that attorney or the doctor to ask any question you
want as to how he reached that conclusion. The conclusion still stands
but I don't think there's anything that prevents you from questioning
as to how he arrived at it.
DR. SEWARD:

May I say something to that?

CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Sure.

DR. SEWARD:
In some states, these panels are so constituted
that their op1n1on is not only allowed to be introduced into the trial
as expert testimony, but it is also presumed to be correct. Now this
is a very small minority of the panels.
In most of the cases the
findings of the panels are allowed to be introduced into the trial,
but theirs is just as open to contesting as any other expert witness.
CHAIID1AN FENTON: Yes, but you contest it by virtue or your
witnesses com1ng in and giving their opinion -- not by questioning the
judge, which I'm sure you would not be allowed to do. Ms. Moorhead
wants to ask you a question.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN JEAN MOORHEAD: WEll, I'm confused as to a comment that you made, doctor, that if somebody came to a physician and
said, "I think we have a basis for a malpractice action," and then that
physician needed to turn to somebody with more expertise.
I didn't
have the feeling that you meant this panel but as we've had this discussion now, I'm confused.
Do you see the panel as the -- as a resource or,as I hear the Chairman saying, the first level of litigation?
I'm confused.
DR. STEWARD:
I think, Ms. Moorhead, that these panels, as
I see them at least, are both.
I think they can constitute a resource
for the injured party.
If the panel looks at this problem and says,
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"Certainly this is a case of medical negligence" then this finding is
given to the plaintiff's counsel and the plaintiff,under the rules
of most of these panels, would be able to draw on the experts constituting the panel, or other medical experts furnished by the society to
support that contention. So it would allow, for instance, a small injury which today if it's $25,000 or less will never see the light of
day because the costs are too much to get it into the system, it would
allow a case like that to be settled in favor of the plaintiff with
much more ease. So they do constitute a resource.
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: Actually, the screening panel says yes
or no to a quest1on. And the question is was there malpractice involved?
DR. SEWARD:

Whether there was any negligence.

ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: Yes, whether there was any negligence.
And the only th1ng that screening panel says in the end is yes or no.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Leroy, it's very important when you're sitting there with a jury, and you bring in some testimony and you say,
"Some panel of experts has decreed that there's no negligence here" -that's a very potent thing ...
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE:
questioning those people.

I find nothing that prevents you from

CHAIRMAN FENTON:
If you're saying that you're going to bring
this legislat1on again and you're going to amend it to say that this
opinion will be admitted as any other expert testimony, and the experts
will be there to be cross-examined by the other party, that's something
else. But you know that's not going to happen because the judge isn't
going to be there.
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE:
I see nothing in the bill that prevents
it now.
If you can show me something about this bill that says you
can't cross-examine ...
CHAIRM&~ FENTON:
Leroy, the way trials work is that if I have
an expert, I would put him on the stand and then the defense attorney,
would have the opportunity,at the time the jury hears his testimony,
to cross-examine him.
Remember they hear the experts testimony and
they hear the cross-examination, and then in their minds they make
their own determination. Okay?

ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN FENTON: Now what you're doing is you're taking a
document or an op1n1on from three people and you're saying to the jury,
"Here is a panel experts made up of a doctor, a lawyer, and a judge,
who have determined that there is or isn't any negligence." Now the
jury doesn't have the opportunity ...
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: No, you put the period there.
I find
nothing in this bill that prevents you from calling on those witnesses.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Leroy, well calling on them is one thing,
-6-

but going through the process of how they make their determination is
something entirely different.
If we're going to take the three members
of the panel and examine them and grant the other side the right to
cross-examination, then you're not going to save any time in the process. Now the arbitration process that we've got going, if it works,
will save a lot of time.
If you're going to allow us to examine the
panel in the normal fashion of bringing them into court and then treating them as regular experts then, except for the fact that some cases
may not have been filed within sixty days, I can't see how you are
going to save any time. I can't see what you've accomplished.
I understand the problem with medical malpractice. We're having a problem with
attorney malpractice.
It's getting to be just as bad as medical malpractice.
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE:

•

And I can see why .

CHAIRMAN FENTON:
I don't quarrel with you. You're quarrel~
ing with the wrong person. The medical malpractice problem is+ caused
by a lot of doctors and attorneys. And attorney malpractice is caused
by attorneys. There are attorneys involved in medical malpractice and
there are doctors involved in medical malpractice, but since doctors
don't practice law, they're not involved in attorney malpractice.
I
agree with you.
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE:
I stated, Assemblyman Fenton, the overwhelming major1ty of all such malpractice cases are won by physicians.
The question then is ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
go to trial.

No, no.

You're talking about those which

ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: Correct. Now comes the question, if
ninety percent of those that go to trial are won by physicians, then
isn't there a question of how many of them are actually still frivolous
suits? And can we, by this divice -- by this screening device, decrease the number that are going to appear on that court calendar without regard to how much effort there is in the courtroom.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
I'm not an expert trial lawyer, but I
would say expert tr1al lawyers will not take a frivolous suit that is
going to take them a long time. You're assuming that all of your
ninety percent are frivolous suits. I won't buy that.
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE:

No, I'm not making any such presumption,

Jack.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
I would guess that most of your ninety
percent are usually your big cases. I can't say all of them but most
of them are cases that there is no way that they could settle beforehand.
I imagine, a good number of them are very serious cases where
the insurance companies and the doctors say he wasn't negligent and
they won't offer enough to settle. The other party believes he is
worth the gamble.
I don't know, Leroy. What I'm trying to say to
you is, from my viewpoint, you've got to find some way to deal with
the admission of the opinion as expert testimony. Under existing law,
if I call an expert in, I've got to pay him. He becomes my witness
now.
If the other side calls a witness in and he says things that
-7-

are wrong, I can challenge him. If you just let the opinion in you
have got to give the other side the right to challenge it by calling
all the panel into court. But if you go through the whole procedure
what have you accomplished. Ms. Moorhead.
ASSEMBLYWm1AN MOORHEAD:

Well, he said that 19 states have

this ...
CHAIID1AN FENTON:

Thirty states.

ASSEMBLYWO~.A.N

MOORHEAD:

Well, he said 19.

DR. STEWARD:

Twenty-nine had them.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORHEAD: Twenty-nine had them and it's man.datory in 19. Okay, what do they do? Can we benefit from what's
happening there?
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, first you've got to understand that
four of these have been declared unconstitutional. As I understand
from the Committee counsel, the reason is that there have been a lot
of administrative delays and therefore the court ruled that these procedures were unconstitutional. The procedures were taking away the
rights of individuals to due process because of the delays.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORHEAD: Well, in the 19 states, is there any
one that has something like what this legislation would establish?
DR. STEWARD: Yes. There are a number -- among the 29 states
which have pre-trlal screening panels, 19 of them are mandatory and
pre-filing. That means before the case has gotten into the mechanism.
CHAiru1AN FENTON:
DR. STEWARD:

Like you're proposing here?

Yes.

CHAiru1AN FENTON:

The other 11 allow screening after filing?

DR. STEWARD: After the action has been filed, and some
either before or after. The mechanism among the states varies tremendously and the composition of the panel varies tremendously.
In
some states there have been seven-member panels. The majority of those
were too unwieldy and they found that they were really not doing much
of anything. Where they have been most successful, they have been constituted of three individuals, most of the time a doctor, a lawyer,
and a judge or a lay person other than a doctor or a lawyer. In those
cases, for instance
Wisconsin, they have been credited with eliminating from the system 15 out of 20 cases. Now that doesn't mean that
they were deciding
favor of the defendant in 15. But they were resolving 15 of the 20 cases. Which is a three-fifths reduction in load
on the court system. And this can't help but be beneficial all the
way around.
ASSEMBLYWm1AN MOORHEAD: So this legislation is patterned
after what you feel is a success in other states?
DR. STEWARD:

Yes.
-8-

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORHEAD:

Thank you.

CHAIIDlAN FENTON: ~lliat happens now if your panel says there
is negligence? what do we do now?
DR. STEWARD:
If the panel says there is negligence, then the
plaintiff's attorney has the option of saying to the defendant, "Your
experts have said that this is malpractice. Do you want to settle?"
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Now as far as the plaintiff is concerned
we haven't changed anything other than issued an opinion. You don't
automatically say to the plaintiff, "The negligence issue has been
resolved. Now when we go to trial, all we're going to try is the
amount of damages."

•

DR. STEWARD: No. The findings of the committee are not
binding on elther s1de. They are not findings as to liability. Now
in some cases -- in some states they are constituted so that they are
empowered to decide liability as well as right or wrong.
But in
Assemblyman Greene's bill ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Wait a minute, Doctor, let me interrupt
you. You're say1ng now this panel doesn't decide liability. You
said earlier the panel decides where there was negligence. When they
decide negligence aren't they deciding liability in effect?
ASSE!I1BLYMAN GREENE:
damages with negligence.
DR. STEWARD:
the panel is ...

I think you misspoke.

You confused

Damages is what I meant to say.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:

In some states

Also decides the amount of damages.

Okay.

DR. STEWARD: But not in the one that is proposed here. So
to answer your question, if the panel says, "Yes,there is liability,"
the plaintiff's attorney can then go to the defendant and say, "We
have a case of obvious malpractice. Do you want to enter into an
equitable settlement?" And perhaps they can enter into an·_equitable
settlement.
CHAirulAN
the mainstream of
amend your bill to
a determination as

FENTON: Well, if we are trying the cases out of
the system of the judicial system, why don't you
say if negligence is found that the same panel makes
to the amount of damages? Why not?

DR. STEWARD: There are various objections to this and this
particular power of the panel has been attacked in a number of jurisdictions on the basis that it is usurping a judicial prerogative.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
mining negligence?
DR. STEWARD:

No.

So you're doing the same thing by deterYou're simply being a group expert witness.

CHAIRMAN FENTON: But what I'm saying is, if the medical
profession is going to say that it wants a pre-screening panel to
-9-

decide if there is negligence, to help the system of jurisprudence,
then to be consistent, it would seem to me, you should let the panel
issue an opinion as to the amount of damages. That will help settle
things. I assure you it will help settle things.
DR. STEWARD: I would be against that, Mr. Fenton, on this
basis. I th1nk amounts of compensation are well within any lay person's ability to make a value judgment. Where I think the medical malpractice problem bogs down is that we're expecting lay people to judge
the scientific facts of the case. And I think in most cases this is
difficult for them. So, I think to give the panel the power to decide
damages is a function it doesn't need.
I think ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Let me ask you this. We're in a medical
malpractice case now, the plaintiff has to have some medical evidence,
and usually it's through a doctor, that the person who provided the
medical service was negligent. Am I correct?
DR. STEWARD:

No.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:
sides, right?
DR. STEWARD:

You don't have an expert opinion on both

Not at this point in time.

CHAIRMAN FENTON: No, no.
our present system for the moment.

Forget that.

Let's talk about

DR. STEWARD: Well that's what I'm talking about. In our
present system all that is necessary is for a patient who feels that
he or she has been injured, to take her case to an attorney. At that
point he files an action ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON: No, no. We're in court now. Listen to
me, Doctor. We're 1n court now. We've gone through everything and
we can't settle the case. Now we're trying the case and I'm the plaintiff's attorney. Don't I bring medical experts in to show negligence?
DR. STEWARD:

Yes.

CHAIIDffiN FENTON: All right. You as a defendant bring in
your experts. Now you're saying to me, in answer to my question, "Lay
people on the jury can't determine scientific matters." Well, neither
can the professionals. Because what you've got not is experts that
are saying, "Yes, there was negligence" and experts saying, "No, there
wasn't." Somebody now has to make a determination as the what we call
question of fact, as to whether there was or wasn't negligence. What
makes the lay person in the jury any less able to do that than a professional as long as you have expert opinion on both sides?
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: Mr. Fenton, aren't you changing the
character of the screen1ng panel?
CHAIRMAN FENTON: No, forget the screening panel.
quarreling w1th that, Leroy.
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE:

No.
-10-

On this point.

I'm not

The nature of the

screening panel is that it renders its opinion to the court, you know,
whether something went wrong or didn't and then it backs away.
It is
not interfering with the court's structure and the court system.
I'm
not telling the court that therefore you are to find the man guilty.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Leroy, I understand that, but the Doctor
said that one of the reasons for this new procedure was that people
are not capable of making sc
ific dec ions. And I said in your
normal malpractice case, there is no scientific decision that has to
be made by a lay person. They have to believe one set of experts or
they have to believe another set of experts. You don't have to be a
scientist and you don't have to be a medical expert to believe one or
the other. That's what I was saying.
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: Let's agree that that's true. Let's
agree that that's true. And let's put it aside and say that you're
right and the Doctor,
's say, was wrong, but here we are again.
In that courtroom what have you got? You've got an opinion, an expert
opinion, okay? It's brought into the courtroom and left sitting there
on the table-- do with
what you will, ...
CHAI~mN FENTON:
No. You have to take the context of my
discussion with the Doctor. I'm not quarreling with your pre-screening. What I said to the Doctor was that as long as the prescreening
panel determines liability, why can't they give an opinion as to darnages? And he said, if I remember correctly, "That the lay person could
determine the amount of damages but can't determine whether somebody
is or isn't negligent." And that's the point of the discussion we're
having now.

ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE:
It seems to me the issue is whether
there is or there isn 1 t some form of negligence on the
of the
physician. The purpose of the screening panel is to try to answer that
question yes or no.
And that's it. Other than that we have no desire
to interfere with the current court system.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: No, we're not interfering. The Doctor
says what he's try1ng to do is unclog the courts and keep cases that
shouldn't be in court out of the system. That will help the court
system as well as help the medical profession.
I agree with that.
DR. STEWARD:

As well as helping the patient.

CHAIRMAN FENTON: Right. And I say as long as you're going
to take th1s pre-screen1ng opinion and let it in as expert testimony
as to liability, then let's let them do it as to damages too. That's
all I say. I'm not quarreling with him.
ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE:
Moorhead.

In a very simple answer, no.

CHAIRMAN FENTON: Of course, I understand.
I 1m just trying to be logical.

Go ahead Ms.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORHEAD:
I was just going to make a comment.
If you did all of that then you haven't changed a lot.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Oh yes you have.
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Let's say this bill

passes and it allows the opinion of the screening panel in as expert
testimony as to two things, whether there was liability and the amount
of damages. I assure you you'll have settlements and a reduction of
cases filed.
Because if these three people say, "There's negligence
in the amount of $50,000," and the insurance company made a previous
determination that they only wanted to settle for $30,000, I assure
you that $50,000 will be reconsidered. That's what Leroy's talking
about. The opinion is going to be very persuasive in the trial.
There's no reason it shouldn't be. If you want the expert opinion as
to negligence to be persuasive, why shouldn't you also allow them to
determine the amount of damages? And he's right, from his point of view
to say, "We don't want it." I understand that. Go ahead, Doctor.
DR. STEWARD: Well, I think that in only a very small minority of the other states which have these panels is the panel empowered
to decide damages.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, we always pride California on being
a leader. Maybe 1f that's good, maybe we should take your concept
and carry it to its proper conclusion.
c~ ahead.
cation.

ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: We're about thirteenth in funding eduDon't tell me about leadership.

CHAIRMAN FENTON: No, there's no question as I was saying to
the media before, that we have a prbblem, particularly in Los Angeles
County.
I think their is still a three to five year wait to bring
civil cases to trial. These cases do clog up calendars. We are always looking for ways to improve the situation.
I'm sure somebody is
going to talk about whether the arbitration system that we passed is
going to help or not.
I do sympathize. Let me say that in 30 years
of practice I've had about three malpractice cases and they were all
good ones.
In fact that were so good I had to refer them to an attorney who knew what he was doing.
I'd always go to a doctor friend of
mine and ask him what he thought. As soon as he told me he thought
it was bad, I had my own screening panel, I just wouldn't handle it.
But that's my own opinion.
DR. STEWARD: Another facet of this problem, at least according to the study done by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, is that only 16 cents out of every premium dollar is
getting to the injured patient.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You're talking to a man who carried no-fault
-- I used to argue that all the time.
DR. STEWARD:

The other 84 cents is going someplace else.

CHAIR}~N FENTON:
You're talking to the wrong person when
you say that. That was my argument a long time ago.
Is it 16 cents?
I think we used to say it was even less than that when we were pushing
no-fault. Leroy was one of my main sponsors.

ASSEMBLYMAN GREENE: Jack, I had malpractice before you did.
I had the same bill you're talking about, no-fault. Then you got to
be Chairman of the committee.
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CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Yes, and then we got it out.

Go ahead,

Doctor.
DR. STEWARD:

Well ...

CHAIRMAN FENTON: I think you have a problem.
I think you
have a concept that should be looked into to see if something could be
done which would be equitable.for both sides. That would do two things.
One, it would help the administration of justice and, two, it would help
the whole medical malpractice field. What you're saying is right but
I don't know how you do it.
If you could get rid of the nuisance
cases ...
DR. SEWARD: Where I think the pre-screening panels would
offer their best services would be to eliminate the nuisance cases.
Now you made a statement a few minutes ago that the accomplished trial
lawyer probably doesn't bring frivolous or baseless cases. Now this
is true. The expert ...
CHAIRM~N

FENTON:

DR. STEWARD:

He doesn't have time.

The expert in malpractice ...

CHAIRMAN FENTON:

He's got enough good ones.

DR. STEWARD: Right. He is not going to bring those. But
the big problem 1s the young attorney who gets out of law school. And
he doesn't have anything else to do and he files five malpractice
cases. We find frequently the cases being filed before the records
are even gotten from the hospital or from the doctor's office. Now,
certainly, that case has not been screened. And these medical malpractice panels would serve this young attorney well in that respect.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
DR. STEWARD:

Thank you very much.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Thank you, Leroy.

Doctor Berggreen.

DR. RAYMOND BERGGREEN: I'm here, Mr. Chairman, really as an
individual not tak1ng a part1cular position, although I have some
opinions that I would like to state. I'm a physician licensed to practice in Iowa and California.
I'm a member of the California and Nevada
bars.
I've had some four years experience under the Nevada program
and I've handled cases in Arizona and I believe I'm competent to ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Are you a defense attorney.

DR. BERGGREEN: I did plaintiff's medical malpractice for
about 10 years. Now, for the last four years I've been doing primarily
defense.
In Nevada, I handled both plaintiff and defense cases before
the screening panels.
I also wrote a paper on alternative methods of
handling malpractice cases that somehow never got published for the
University of San Francisco. But I believe one of the members of the
Senate has a copy of that.
I have some opinions generally on screening
panels. I have some opinions specifically on AB 2019.
I believe, as
written, it's a very poor piece of legislation for a number of reasons
-13-

that I hope to get into. Mr. Lopez was kind enough to send a letter
that had some Committee guidelines on the points that he believed the
Committee was interested in. And referring to that in a paragraph by
paragraph method, I think under his first paragraph as to whether or
not there are problems existing in malpractice, it probably requires
candor to acknowledge, and I feel the Committee would agree, that this
gets to the Committee because it's a dollar problem for physicians and
a dollar problem for carriers. They look at this as some way to resolve those problems. And it does in a number of ways. As a practical
matter these screening panels add about a year to the litigation process in Nevada.
From the time you file the claim until your panel has
heard it and until you
le your complaint, about a year has expired.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
when you ...

Does that waive the statute of limitations

DR. BERGGREEN: The statute of limitations is tolled during
that period, 1n Nevada. But in essence it allows the carriers to
hold their money for another year. They've increased their profit
by that amount.
In addition, in that period of time from the filing
to trial, a number of plaintiffs have died, for example. So it s a
benefit to the defendants or the carriers. Basically, it is another
manifestation of the fact that the medical profession, with some justification, feels that it should judge itself. As you've heard testimony already, they don't feel that lay people are capable of judging
the complicated medical issues that appear before juries at trial.
And in the bill as presented here, it's the single M.D. aspect of the bill that I think is most objectionable. You're going to
end up with one doctor of questionable bias, of questionable expertise
on the subject, who will in effect carry the issue of liability to his
non-medical panel members.
will turn to him to say, "Was the
operation indicated? Was it technically performed?
We don't understand. You're our
" So you have a single doctor who's going
to carry that, and I think that it is eminent
unfair.
The only thing really wrong with the existing court procedures, if you look at it from the physician's standpoint, is the
size of the verdict. Most of the cases, as you know, are settled
out of court. You've heard th
testimony that n
out of ten cases
that go to verdict are won by the doctors and that's some evidence
that there are a lot of frivolous claims filed. Well, six percent
of the tort cases that are ever filed ever go to trial. Most of them,
as you know, are settled before trial. And those ten cases that ultiinately get to trial are those where there
a genuine dispute on the
of damages.
It isn't that they're frivolous because all those
cases go to trial with expert testimony so somebody thinks there is
some negligence. The fact that the nine out of ten go for the physicians is indication of perhaps a number of things. Perhaps the respect
with which the medical profession is held by members of the public.
But as a practical matter, if you re trying so few of them the burden
of medical malpractice cases per se in trial is not all that great on the
system. You're right. Down in L. A. County they have their problems
getting to trial. As a matter of fact, in the Central District you
can't get a case out to trial unless you're building up to the five
year statute. But that is not primarily the result of the number of
medical malpractice cases being filed. And I don't think that the
-14-
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The third paragraph had to do with the
ues. There
are two of them.
In the first place
can't be
on the defendant, even though you get the issue of damages dec
the screening
panel.
It's not bind
The doctor will say that under the Sixth
Amendment he's entitled to be tried by a jury of his peers. So that
except for the pressure of having had a panel verdict against him
there's no compulsion to pay money. And even in Nevada where we have
had an occasional verdict by the panel that was favorable to the plaintiff it has been necessary to file the case and go through all the
things that you would have done otherwise. Do your discovery. Do
your negotiations and ultimately settle
The
that you go before the panel and get a verdict and go with your open hand and they
will pay you, is nonsense.
I think the most important legal issue,
and it has been decided in some other states, is as to whether or not
it's constitutional. There is an excellent Fourteenth Amendment-equal protection argument against these things, that the plaintiff who
has been injured by a doctor is required to go through these steps,
pay these costs and take this additional time when another plaintiff
who has been injured by a negligent automobile driver, isn't required
to do all that. And that's the basis on which these plans have failed
in the other states. And I have serious doubts as to what a California
court would do with that argument if
were raised.
The fourth paragraph was what's done in other states. In
Nevada it's a six-member panel. They have three doctors and three
lawyers. One of the problems with it is no pre-hearing discovery is
allowed.
So in essence you file a claim based on what the plaintiff
says. You get the medical records and you go in and in two or three
hours in an evening, attempt to try a case that would take you three
weeks in court, because you've done no discovery. The virtue of it
was that if the pla
iff succeeded in winning a decision that the
county medical soc
would provide him with an expert witness in
case the case went to trial. The findings of the panel would not be
admissible. But if you won, they said, "i>Je' 11 give you a doctor."
As a practical matter, if you win your case and go to the county medical society and say, "Look, I won. Give me a doctor to testify,"
what you hear more often than not is, "Well, we can't find anybody who
will come in and testify for you." So in essence, you're back where
you were before, to square one. You file your claim.
You've waited
a year, then you get your result whatever it is. You file your complaint. You do your discovery. You get your own witnesses. You complete your own negotiations. And then you go to trial. You've done
nothing except waste the time and what money it has taken in that involvement. You still have to file in court. You still have to do your
discovery. You still have to get your expert witnesses.
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The panel proceedings, as I said, are inadmissible for any
purpose. One of the problems that has arisen is, as I say, we can't
do pre-trial discovery.
In essence when you take the defendant doctor
before the panel and question him to lay out your case, you are in
effect taking his deposition. So that if vou proceed with the case
later, he has had his deposition taken once. He knows the questions
you are going to aSk him, he's fully prepared. Because the-proceedings of the panel aren't admissible, if he changes his testimony, as
he frequently does, there is no way you can go back and say, "But
doctor, at the screening panel you said thus and so and now you testify in this way," because whatever happened in the panel isn't admissible.
Arizona, as was set forth in the letter from the Judicial
Council, is a little better I think. Arizona has a panel that has, I
think, three doctors and three lawyers and a judge. They allow full
discovery before the matter goes before the panel. So you take your
depositions. You do your interrogatory. But when it's all done in
essence you do what you do before trial in California. Most of the
cases that I've handled in Arizona are settled or otherwise disposed
of, without ever going before the screening panel. So that it exists
as a threat, for whatever that's worth, and there the findings of the
panel are admissible. They are not admissible as expert testimony
but the jury may give it whatever weight they choose to. They are informed that it has been heard by a panel of doctors and lawyers and
they found thus and so. But to admit it as expert testimony is something else. But as a practical matter the existence of the panel in
Arizona has really done nothing to change the time or the course of
the litigation. You file your claim. You do your discovery. You
engage in negotiations. Most of them are settled or otherwise disposed of. And in my experience it has been a rare one that has had to
go before the screening panel. So if you are looking for a way to
develop a panel and to use it, I think the criteria and the structure
of the Arizona panel and its use is certainly far better than what
they use in Nevada and infinitely better than what's been proposed
in AB 2919.
I think AB 2919 is bad in general because I don't think it
would stand against the equal protection argument.
I think it is bad
specifically because the plaintiff has to file a claim but there's
nothing in it that the defendant has to provide an answer. So you go
into your hearing without knowing what position the defendant is going
to take on it. In the second place, it excludes hospitals and other
health care providers. So if the plaintiff has got a case that involves
~egligence on the part of a hospital and negligence on the part of a
doctor, he's got to bifurcate it and try this one case against the
doctor, even though the hospital may be involved, before the screening
panel and then, depending on the result, try to combine that in a case
in court against the hospital. Now, we are faced with that problem
already in California where we have compulsory arbitration against
certain individuals. For example, in SoutP.ern California all Kaiser
cases have to be arbitrated. If you have a case that involves care at
Kaiser and then they go to another hosptial and you contend that there
is negligence on the part of both of them, and it happens frequently,
you have to arbitrate your case against Kaiser, and you have to file
vour case in court against the other ,defendants and somehow divide
them both and make one case out of it.
It's a terribly difficult
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thing.
I think
in the future will have to be done about
that. But if you add to that problem by requiring that doctors have
to go before a screening panel and the other people don't, you've
added to that sea of problems. My third cr icism is the use of a
single physician on the
As I've said before,
becomes the
expert for them. Fourth, that the scope of discovery in this bill
isn't set out at all
And f fth, because of the
that you
have to file within 60
it's an attempt,
an unwarranted
and perhaps unconstitutional attempt, to further limit the stature of
limitations as it applies to medical malpractice cases. The attempts
have been made and actual
been successful to some extent in constricting that in the Keene bill. And each year we face additional limitations on that. And I think to further limit that in this legislation
would be unfair and unwarranted.
I have nothing further.
CHAIRJVJAN FENTON:

Ms. Moorhead want's to ask a question.

ASSEMBLY\II]OMl\N HOORHEAD:
I'm interested in the time frame
that you were talking about because, as you
, there is such a
length of time in this state before one goes to trial, and I was confused over the year. Did you say that it adds an additional year in
Nevada?
MR. BERGGREEN:

As a practical matter ...

ASSEMBLYWOHAN MOORHEAD:

And how does Arizona differ from

Nevada?
MR. BERGGREEN: Well, as a practical matter, in Nevada, you
file your claim before the screening panel and then the screening panel
gives you a date. Because there have been so many cases filed, they
just can't find members of the screening panel to hear these things
and because six people are involved it takes a
time to find a
night, and these are held in the evenings, when the screening panel
can act.
So there are postponements and continuances. And as a matter of practical -- for all practical purposes,
the time you file
until you have your
and you get the result of your hear
a year has passed. Now, in that year vou have done nothing.
You
can't take depositions. You can't engage in discovery. You can't
really engage in negotiations. Nothing has happened.
So, you've
wasted a year. You
the result of your screening panel and then you
file your case in court and you proceed as vou would otherwise. So
you've added a year to that time.
Now in Arizona, you file your case before the screening
panel. You are allowed to do your normal discovery and everything
proceeds as it would if the case had been filed in court, except that
what you are aiming for is ultimately a date before the screening panel
rather than a trial date.
So having done your normal discovery, having
engaged in your normal negotiations based on that, the chances are that
this would be one of the nine out of ten cases that will be settled or
otherwise disposed of without the necessity of a hearing.
So you haven't
wasted that time. You can use that time for the normal discovery procedures that you would do in a superior court case in California.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HOORHEAD: So if you had less panelists and
they were able to do more, would you think there was any merit to this
proposal?
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MR. BERGGREEN: Less panelists may be of some importance. I
had a suggest1on, really, that I thought it might be wise if you were
seriously interested in it and you thought that there was enough of a
problem that it would be of acute importance to do something about it,
it would be wise to expend some funds to establish a pilot program in
one or two of the counties in California where we're having most of
our problems in getting these cases to trial.
It should only be used
in cases where all the defendants are physicians, so you don't have
this mixture that would compound it.
If you've got a case against a
doctor and a hospital that wouldn't apply.
I think the panel should
probably consist of two lawyers and two doctors, but that each side
should have the opportunity to select its own.
In Nevada they are
selected at random from the list of the medical society. You never
know who you're going to get. You can get some real turkeys, maybe
somebody that you've sued. Although you have a chance to bump them,
you very frequently end up with some pretty hostile panel members.
But if the defendant selected a member from the medical profession
and the plaintiff selected a member and each side selected a lawyer,
I know you would end up with four.
Ideally you should have five if
you are going to decide it but I have a further point to make.
I
think you should allow full discovery before the panel proceeds to
trial, then and only then would you use the unanimous verdict of the
panel to be admissible in evidence. If they divided on it or if they
went three-two, maybe there would be sufficient dispute as to the
merit and it should be decided by a jury. But if you had a unanimous
verdict in a case where full discovery had proceeded and the matter
was heard before a panel where a reasonable lack of bias was assured
by the use of the panel members that had been selected by each side,
I think there is a reasonable chance that the screening panel would
work.
You still have the delay, you still have the constitutional
arguments, but if you're going to put a panel together it should include some of the safeguards I believe that we've discussed.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN

~100RHEAD:

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN FENTON: Thank you, Doctor.
Jerry Wilson -- not here? Okay, Ed Kerry.

Very enlightening.

MR. EDGAR KERRY:
Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ed Kerry, represent1ng the Judicial Council. Thank you for the opportunity to express our views on this particular proposal. The comments
that I'm about to make are not be be construed as indicating opposition
to the concept of screening cases in some fashion.
I would like to
turn specifically to the questions that are raised by the Committee
Counsel in the analysis.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Do you want your letter dated October 10
to be part of the record, Ed?l
MR. KERRY:
Please.
I would certainly appreciate that and
I am simply go1ng to highlight that so you can follow along if you like.
The question I would like to begin with is question number two here,
raised by the Committee, "Would the screening of malpractice claims
be a more economical method of handling malpractice cases?" Our feeling
l
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is that it would not be a more economica method for four reasons.
The first reason is s
that this bill
an entirely new
procedure which is over and above the existing judicial process.
It
is not in lieu of. And this is a fa
expensive procedure but I'll
defer the cost comment for a few moments. So we're talking about setting up a non-judie 1
where requests for panel determinations
have to be filed. No question as to whether or not that is a first
paper of filing in terms of the court's reaction to it. There are
notices that have to be served, the other
ies have to be noticed,
the other party has the opportunity to respond to that. There have
to be lists developed and maintained of both attorneys and doctors.
Those people have to be selected. You have pre-hearing discovery,
which we think will be very extensive. And you also have, of course,
the deliberations by the panel itself.
That is a very cos
process,
and that is over and above the existing process. That's the first concern that we have that leads us to the conclusion that this would be
less economical .
The second one here is the issue of discovery. As you may
note, this bill imposes a new standard of discovery. It is much more
restrictive than discovery rights in exis
California law. We think
that that is going to result in extensive law and motion practice as
to what is permissible to be discovered and what
not. That's going
for disto duplicate existing discovery. This does not subst
covery which will be post filing.
The third point we raise here is simply that you have an
existing arbitration system in California.
It is mandatory for specified types of cases, $15,000 or less.
If the plaintiff opts to go to
arbitration and agrees that the disposition will not exceed $15,000, he
can also take it to arbitration. Th
dupl
, in essence, the
actions of the arb
ion panel for those types of cases.
The final point I want to make on this
ion 2a is that
something in the neighborhood of 6 percent of the total PI cases, and
that includes these types of cases medical malpractice, go to trial,
only 6 percent of the cases. In the other 94 percent of the cases,
there is very little judicial activity, court act
judge time involved. This proposal requires in that 94 percent wh
currently
have very little judicial activity, that extensive activity result by
involving the clerks office, by involving the judge. We think that
that doesn't make a lot of sense and that is indeed a very costly
propOsition.
The second question here that I would like to respond to was
question 2b, and I have broken this down because in your memo you've
got about five questions lumped together in the second paragraph,
"'V-7ha t costs would be involved in using a pre-trial screening process? u
The first cost that we see is the cost of setting up this new system.
Now the existing arbitration system, our experience tells us, results
in a cost of approximately $25 per case that goes to arbitration.
This is the purpose of selecting that panel, of dealing with chal~
langes to the members, of the paperwodk, back and forth. This bill requires some additional input in the sense that you've got the prehearing discovery matters and we think a reasonable cost figure here
would be $30 per case. Now, in 1979, there were approximately 8,000
cases filed against physicians and surgeons.
If you multiply that out
by $30 per case in terms of the administrative costs, you are talking
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the courts by pre-trial screening?" And I would like to combine that
with the question number three on legal issues. We feel there are
substantial additional burdens that are placed upon the courts under
this proposed system. The first I would call to your
is
this, this bill says that a clerk cannot file a case, if it falls into
a number of different categories. Clerks perform minister
functions.
They do not perform discretionary functions.
This bill would appear to
require the clerk to begin reading every single action that is filed to
make a decision as to whether it falls into these categories. And if
it falls into each of these specified groups, it cannot be filed.
Query, does that raise the 1
lity question? What if the clerk is
wrong? Basically, the clerk does not have the training or skills to
make this kind of a legal discretionary judgment.
The next question here which we think
very, very significant, is a constitutional issue but it is not the one that you have
already heard about. This is the notion that
s bill requires the
establishment of an entirely new nonjudicial system and yet look who
is responsible for carrying out all of the actions under this system;
it is the judicial branch of government. We think that that is simply
unconstitutional as it requires the judicial branch of government to
be involved in nonjudicial activities. It requires a lot of judge
time, and a lot of clerk time.
Another issue we think ought to be raised here is that this
type of a request is filed with the clerk.
Immedia
not withstanding the condition of the calendar, you may have cases backlogged
for two, three, or five years. The judge has to immediately extricate
himself and become involved in a nonjudicial process, leaving all of
these other cases behind in order to move toward an advisory opinion
that this panel is going to give. That is a s
ficant issue. This
category of potential litigants is given a tremendous advantage in
terms of receiving an advisory opinion, everything else s
required to stay still. Query, what will the impact of that be on
existing court calendars?
The converse argument that has been made is of course the
equal protection argument in terms of requiring this category of
litigants to go through these additional processes. Three additional
points only, and some of them are a little bit techn
I would
point out first of all that in conjunction with the exis
one year
statute of limitation, this poses a very substantial burden on the
claimant, because the statute is not tolled while all of this is going
on.
If you begin to back up and ask, how much t
does it take to
get the request in, to have the service of process, to have the response in, and then just set up the panel, to go through all of the
pre-hearing discovery, you are liable to conclude that the claimant
has to file this request within a matter of weeks of the time of the
initial alleged injury. We think that is a serious problem that ought
to be dealt with. A second point here is the discovery issue. You
are liable to have multiple defendants, I don't see from a judicial
point of view how you can possibly complete all of the discovery. You
may have two or three doctors, an anesthesiologist, an ambulance driver,
and a hospital. The time frame poses serious considerations. Finally,
here I raise the question, how realistic is it to expect doctors and
lawyers to provide pro bono service, quite aside from the bias issue.
And I think that is a very substantial issue that you have raised
-21-
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CHAIRJI.IAN FENTON:
office?

you talk

about time away from your

MR. MART: No, I am talking about hard cost, jury fees,
witness fees, expert fees, in any type of malpractice case.
CHAIRJiAN FENTON:

That you have to pay and can lose if you

don't win.
MR. MART: Right. For example, I have not tried a medical
malpractice case since December of 1978. Fortunately I won that case.
I had $25,000 in costs. Every other case has settled. And I have
settled them quite regularly and you make a heck of a lot more money
settling than going into court and that is the nuts and bolts of
it. There are a small number that do go on to trial.
I think the
system should air those cases. They are not the frivolous lawsuit.
If they were frivolous, the summary judgment procedure would eliminate
them.
Another great threat to the lawyer is the malicious prosecution cases. And there is getting to be a great frequency of those in
the courts.
In fact, I am sure it will be the subject of some sort of
legislation in the near future because of the problems it is creating
on the judicial system. As it stands now, the frivolous case is weeded
out. It is the case that goes to trial, and it is true that nine out
of ten are lost, it is because you have expert testimony on both sides
of the issue and the natural tendency of jurors is more toward the
defense than the plaintiff. When I talk to a client about settling
a case, I spend about an hour of my time just talking about the problems of winning in clear cut cases, where I have strong witnesses from
university centers who still will not necessarily carry the day in
front of a jury on a very strong case. The risks are just against the
malpractice litigant. They are foolish to go to trial. But I think
that the system can affort it.
If we look at the statistics, the number of cases that went
to trial that resulted in verdicts of more than $30,000 was 13 cases
in 1979. That figure is from the statistics from the Board of Medical
Quality, that have to be recorded. About nine out of ten cases are
lost, so if we do a little mathematics we are talking about approximately 150 cases throughout the whole state that are actually being
tried, that are taking up judicial time. My own practical experience
is I settle more than 20 cases as compared to every time I go to trial
in a medical malpractice case.
I would almost say a lot more in the
way of statistics.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Jim, I don't quarrel with you. I understand what you are say1ng. But there are also quite a few cases that
consume a lot of judicial time by virtue of going through various
stages, then settle late. You are talking about those that actually
go to trial.
MR. MART:
I agree, but as the Judicial Council witness indicated, the court time in the cases that don't go to trial is fairly
minimal. Usually the first time the court gets involved, except on
some discovery motions, -- really the competent practitioners don't
fight great battles on discovery bccnus0 they are costly. You can
make et frivolous motion, but you are just wasting your time and a lot
of money. There is that practical side of it.
It just seems to me that we are imposing, by a screening
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panel, a very costly procedure and I agree with the statements about
the cost of the courts, but the cost to the doctors and the litigants
is just immense. And I say just to the doctors, not the insurance
company. A very impressive witness in my mind was Dr. Berggreen. He
is now doing principally defense work. These screening panels would
be just a joy to the defense bar.
In those states where they have
screening panels, and my only personal experience has been with Nevada,
but I have had feedback from other attorneys as to how they work and
particularly we get a lot of feedback about the Nevada system, there
is no such thing as settlement in a medical malpractice case until you
have completed this screening panel procedure. The doctor may as well
take a shot there and see what happens.
It is not binding on him. If
it comes out nonliability or not meritorious, whatever the standard
they are using, the cases generally would disappear.
Then they go
ahead and they fight the liability cases.
I mentioned on the way
over here to Jim Frayne that one experience that I had in a case that
I was associated with where the panel in Nevada found that it was a
meritorious case, they sent him over to their medical society to
a witness as Dr. Berggreen indicated, and the witness refused to support
the panel. He came in eventually as a witness for the defense, and
there was a defense verdict in the case.
Ralph Drayton came in behind
him, and during Dr. Berggreen's testimony he started repeating a similar
story that he had heard. And that is what happens.
It gives a free
shot to the defense that is a very costly one.
Perhaps constructively maybe I can make a suggestion, and
this is off the top of my head, it is something that I have always
believed in that I think is not being used adequately by the court
system, and certainly by the litigants and the insurance companies, it
is a better use of the settlement conference procedure that we have and
at a more meaningful time. As
stands now, we don't have a mandatory
settlement conference, but most courts sort of impose a sort of mandatory conference whereby at least you are dragged in a room with the
judge and somebody starts talking back and forth and they are by and
large effective in the average case. Almost all these occur about a
month to two weeks and in some counties maybe a week before trial.
It
is at a stage where a considerable amount of litigation costs have
already been expended.
In the medical malpractice case, many times
the ability to settle the cases at figures that make sense to everybody, kind of evaporates away because of the delay. A week before a
medical malpractice case, I can't afford to settle the case, I have
gone out and spent -- it's not that I can't afford it but my price
settlement has to take into account the cost to my client in part.
So, one of the suggestions would be to incorporate into this settle,nent conference procedure, in the medical malpractice cases, a settlement judge who gets involved in that case, maybe at a six month interval, who then follows up with the settlement conference before trial
that isn't settled and use that procedure as a method of getting the
people together at the early stages. The problem of settlement from
the insurance companies' point of view in the early stage is that they
are not educated about their own case.
I am scheduled to go to trial
at the end of this month in a case in which they just absolutely said
there was no liability, yet they cannot-- it is all based on x-rays.
Right now the defense attorneys are conceding to me that they don't
have a ghost of a chance.
I have two of the foremost experts out of
Stanford. They can't even disclose a radiologist that can interpret
the films differently than ours, yet the 90 day letter did not help.
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I know the doctor in that case, a very reputable fine doctor, who I
know through feedback from other doctors wants that case settled.
That case should have been settled long ago, but we have to go through
all the steps of these procedures. So a stronger settlement procedure
would be the place that I would aim it. If you want to rid yourself
of those 6 percent of the cases and get those cases settled, get them
settled in the early stages when people can be practical with good
strong settlement judges.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
conference?

Doesn't L. A. have an earlier settlement

MR. MART:
I am not familiar with L.A., but by early you
are probably talking three years as opposed to five.
You see, in
Sacramento we do get to trial occasionally in a year or a year and a
half.

I

CHAIRMAN FENTON: Doesn't it take quite a while for all of
your discovery proceedings to go through.
In a lot of cases you need
them don't you?
MR. MART: Yes, that is why I am suggesting like six months.
Normally here 1s what we do. We file a lawsuit.
In a relatively short
period of time we take the defendant doctor's deposition; they take our
parties deposition -- at that point the case by and large evolves into
an expert fight.
And at that point in most cases I will go see doctors
I know locally who will not testify and will tell me about the case.
And I know the merits of the case. Maybe I have my medical research
done.
I am prepared to talk settlement in that case. At that point
I don't need to have my testifying expert. And the same is true with
the defense.
They get their consultations, not their final ones in
the early stages. Everybody ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Why don't they want to talk about settlement when they have all those dollars, potential dollars, in costs
that they may have to pay in the end?
MR. MART:
I think the main thing is that -- and this is why
settlement conferences are valuable -- that it is a problem inherent
in the advesary system for the guy to say, "Let's talk settlement."
They really do get stuck up on the etiquette of it. And many times
it is the laziness of the legal profession.
I don't mind being critical of our profession.
I have times where I will walk out of a
plaintiff deposition, and I know this happens on my side of the fence
and by me perhaps too many times -- my experience being with defense
attorneys -- and I say to them, "Look, you've seen everything here.
You know what I am going to be able to produce. Now let's sit down
and discuss this case." He'll say, "Well I haven't had an expert review it." "Well get an expert to review it and then let's get together.
Why wait till the settlement conference?" But the case tails away because nobody bothers to do anything.
If you have to go to a settlement conference, the conscientious attorney, and there are a few you
know, will try, maybe they don't go up to the level that they should,
but maybe we are all being idealists when we expect those things.
The settlement conferences,particularly in .the early stages, do force
the attorney, just like the Certificate of Merit, to do his homework,
to do his job. Most of us are fairly busy people. And you know we
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put off things.
I am sure in your profession as a legislator there
are times where you know the priorities as to what has to be done is
what you do. So, I really think the settlement conference procedure
that becomes more effective may be really the solution.
I would take
that step before I would set up a bureaucracy of a whole new screening
panel. And I do have to say that we are being exceedingly naive if we
feel we are going to have them serve without compensation.
I serve as
an arbitrator under the compulsory arbitration and apparently I was
the second in being chosen by the various attorneys this last year, one
defense attorney had a couple more than I, and I get paid but I lose
money even though I am getting paid.
I don't mind. There are some of
us that will serve. Who is going to serve? On the plaintiffs side you
are going to have the officers of the CTLA. A very biased bunch. You
are not going to get impartiality there. ~fuo are you going to get out
of the medical profession to serve without pay? You are going to get
only the ardent hater of the medical malpractice and lawyers that are
going to be willing to dedicate their time.
So you are going to have
to put up money. And it is going to be expensive. And it is not going
to be two and three hours, these hearings.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: What we should do is mandate an expert
expediter in all the courts, one of the judges and give him a club.
MR. ~1ART: Well, you really want to know the ultimate answer?
But I am not sure the Legislature or I as a taxpayer are willing to
do it. We need to set up an effective statewide peer review. Take it
away from the local hospitals and the local medical staffs, and have
objective people doing peer review. And as an auxilliary of their peer
review they also can make recommendations concerning medical malpractice.
You build in a whole new bureaucracy and I am not too sure that's ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
You can do the same thing with the legal
profession, we have malpractice ...
MR. ~~RT: No question.
In fact one of the things, one comment that I have written down here to emphasize this is let's assume
I have a serious case, where there is a death, or there is a disability,
a person isn't going to work the rest of their life, I guarantee you I
am not going to spend two or three hours in front of some panel to present that case with the risk that it is going to a jury with no liability.
I am going to bring out all my guns. And it is unfair that
I have to expose all my guns at that stage of the case, but I know
about legal malpractice because my insurance rates are going up and I
don't want my client going down the street a month later when she has
a no liability finding and saying to me, "V.Tell, why didn't you bring
in Doctor so-and-so from Stanford or whatever." Ultimately maybe we
will have to do something more dramatic, but the Legislature has been
very, very effective in the legislation that they have passed.
Some
of it I don't like but it has been effective and fortunately in some
parts the courts have helped this in terms that some of the zeal that
went beyond our constitutional framework, we always have that background, but it has been helpful.
So let's give it more time.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Thank you very much.

Bob Uyeyama.

MR. BOB UYEYAMA:
~r. Chairman, my name is Bob Uyeyama and
I am acting County Clerk of Sacramento County and I am representing
-26-

the County Clerk's Association.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: You are very unhappy with this because it
is going to give you more work, right.
I don't mean to suggest this
is not important because it's o~ten when changes are made they forget
that they are mandating additional administrative work for people involved in handling the cases.
MR. UYEYAMA: Well, the County Clerks Association would like
to go on record opposing this bill, simply because it creates additional work on the part of the county clerks throughout the state.
And I would like to incorporate into my testimony the letter dated
September 10, 1980, by J. s. Simpson.2
This bill requires a clerk of the superior court to accept
and file all requests for hearing claims filed by plaintiffs for seeking damages as a result of medical malpractice. The clerks are required to number each document, file endorsed copies and put them in
the file. And this would create additional work on the part of the
county clerk.
It also requires that the county clerk mail a copy of
the request to the physician and s-urgeon by registered mail, return
receipt requested. This again would be costly and the county clerk
would have to bear this cost. The county clerk must also notify the
complainant in the event that no receipt d!s returned, another additional work on the part of the county clerk. This bill provides that
the physician and surgeon may file a response why he or she is not
liable to the complainant. Again, this recruires additional work on
the part of the cierk. This bill provides --that the hearing shall be
scheduled as soon as possible after the screening panel is formed;
however, the bill does not specify who shall schedule the hearing nor
does it specify whether a notice shall be given.
It is presumed that
the county clerk will perform these tasks. And this bill provides
that any relevant evidence shall be admitted. And again, it is presumed that the medical records will be introduced into evidence at
these screening panels and there's no provisions for disposition of
that documentary evidence.
This bill requires the screening panel to
render a decision within 10 days of the end of the hearing. Although
not specified by the bill, it is assumed that the clerk shall mail the
decision to the parties, another additional task by the clerk. And
lastly, this bill provides that a complaint may be filed within 60
days of the date the decision is rendered, whether the panel determines
that there is liability' or whether there is no liability. And before
the clerk can accept the complaint filing, the clerk must determine
whether or not it is timely. This would again require the clerk to
determine when the decision was rendered. More additional work on
the part of the clerk.
CHAI~N
M~.

FENTON:

UYEYAMA:

This bill would keep you hopping.

That's correct, Mr. Fenton.

CHAIRMAN FENTON: Yes, some of the other witnesses brought
up the point. You would be given some discretionary duties. Making
those determinations could get you in a mess of trouble too, I imagine.
2

Appendix B
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MR. UYEYAMA:

That's correct.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:
HR. UYEYAMA:

Thank you very much, Bob.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Mr. Simoni.

Our last

~tli tness.

MR. RALPH SIMONI: Mr. Chairman and members. I am Ralph
Simoni, represent1ng the State Bar Committee on the Administration of
Justice. I would like to preface my. comments by stating that this is
the position of the State Bar Committee on the Administration of Justice, and not that of the Board of Governors. They have not reviewed
this measure or the concept of medical malpractice screening panels.
If the bill is introduced, they certainly will.
CAJ generally considers medical malpractice screening panels
as adverse to the interest of the litigants, both the plaintiff and
defendant, with no corresponding benefit to either party or to the
court system. Rather than limit or impede litigation, it is quite
possible that medical malpractice screening panels would actually increase litigation on such issues as the extent of discovery, et cetera.
In essence, what they would do is superimpose upon the regular litigation process these additional procedures which both parties would be
required to go through.
I think the crux of the issue has basically been brought
forward by some of the preceeding witnesses in opposition to this
measure. That is basically the discovery process. I think that's
probably the most important. This bill would provide for a very
limited form of discovery.
It should be noted that discovery is essential to the development of the case of the parties. Assemblyman
Greene testified that only 6 percent of the medical malpractice cases
that are filed actually go to trial. There are many reasons for this
but I would propose that the most important reason would be that the
discovery has eliminated many of the cases that did not have the sufficient facts in order to take it to trial and counsel has either settled or dropped the particular case.
There are a couple of points that have not been brought up.
With respect to the requirement that the person who is medically injured file a request that a screening panel hear a claim for damages,
I assume that it is erroneous draftsmanship and probably was meant to
be a claim for liabilities, since that is what we were discussing here.
: think there are going to be many issues raised with respect to what
the request would consist of. These would be issues that would be
brought before a law and motion calendar similar to an issue with respect to the sufficiency of pleadings. It is important to note that
merely upon a request, the court would be required to establish and
set up a medical malpractice screening panel. There is no abi~ity to
preclude this or short circuit that particular setting up of the panel.
It could lead to situations where vexatious lawsuits were filed or
vexatious requests were filed and you would not have the ability such
as a demurrer or other procedural mechanisms to actually preclude the
establishing of the panel.
The chairman has discussed the problems with respect to the
-28-
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impartiality and the composition of the panel. We would agree with
him wholeheartedly.
I think the most crucial concern in addition to
discovery, is with respect to the evidentiary standard which sets up
the standard providing for any sort of relevant evidence shall be
admitted if it is the sort of evidence on which responsible persons
are accustomed to rely on in the conduct of serious affairs. This
standard totally lacks any judicial consistency. It would obviously
lead to a considerable amount of litigation. It should be important
to note that this evidentiary standard, as elusive as it is, would
govern the admissibility of any decision of the screening panel at a
trial on the merits of the case.
In essence, what we would be doing,
we would be elevating this screening panel composed of a judge, an
attorney, a physician or a surgeon to the status of an expert witness
without any ability to qualify or determine whether they are.
I believe the Chairman adequately stated that this would in essence permit the two competing professions, that is the legal profession and
the medical profession, to confron themselves on a different level
with the hopes that one of them would prevail with the decision of
the screening panel which could then be introduced as expert testimony
in the trial itself.
Another issue of primary concern would be the practical concern of counsel concerning the relative statute of limitations with
respect to causes of action against health care providers. This bill
basically requires that upon the rendering of a decision by the medical malpractice screening panel, the party would have 60 days in
which to file a complaint.
I would just point out that the Code of
Civil Procedure Section 340.5 provides for a three years statute of
limitations for the filing of a complaint. And I am not sure how a
court or counsel could reconcile the 60 day period provided for in
AB 2919 with the present three year statute of limitations for causes
of actions.
I believe the prior witnesses have discussed the issues
concerning the unconstitutionality, which this Committee should also
consider very seriously.
I have no further comments, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Thank you very much, Ralph. Thank you
all very much.
It has been quite interesting to hear about all these
points. The hearing is now adjourned.

# # # # # #
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October 10, 1980

Hon. Jack Fenton,
rman
Assembly Judiciary Committee
4112 State Capitol
Sacramento, CA 95814
Dear Assemblyman Fenton:
'!'he foll
comments are made
response
to a number of s
fie ques
AB 2919 raised
by your Principal Consultant, Mr. Rubin Lopez, in his
letter of September 26, 1980.
Ques. #1.

This question can best be answered
by the California
al Lawyers.

Ques. #2A. The proposed screening of malpractice
claims would not be a more economical
method of handling malpractice cases
for a variety of reasons:
1.

Expensive New Nonjudicial System Required.
This measure
res the es
shment of an
entirely new, nonjudicial procedure, in addition to,
not in lieu of, the existing judi al process. More
specifically, a separate, non-j
, administrative
system is required.
Documents are to be filed, copied,
and noticed.
are to be filed.
Attorney and
doctor eligibi
lists are to be developed and
maintained for the selection of panels. Prehearing
discovery motions are to be calendared and argued.
Sessions of screening panels are to be calendared,
hearings to be held and findings made in each case.
All of this is nonjudicial
nature. Yet, judicial
staff, including judges, are required to assume these
responsibilities.

2.

Duplicates Discovery
Discovery rights, under California law, are quite
extensive. This proposal limits the discovery in medical
malpractice cases to such matters "as are probably
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necessary for the hearing. " Personal injury cases,
and medical malpractice cases in particular, depend
upon extensive discovery. The establishment of a
separate, more limited, and vague standard for discovery
rights under this nonjudicial screening system, will
be highly controversial and almost certainly will lead
to extensive prehearing law and motion discovery
practices to define the new perimeters for discovery.
Because this standard is more restrictive, this discovery will not eliminate the need for extensive
discovery subsequent to the filing of any action.
It will duplicate existing discovery and will impose
substantial additional administrative costs.
3.

Duplicates Arbitration
In cases involving less than $15,000, whether
under mandatory arbitration or election by plaintiff,
the required hearings will duplicate existing arbitration hearings except that a panel of three, instead
of one, will be involved and, because of limited
discovery, the panel will have less information
on which to base a determination of liability than is
true under existing arbitration.

4.

Needlessly Forces Expenditure of Judicial Resources.
Generally speaking, approximately 6% of personal
injury cases ever go to trial. While there is some
court time involved through law and motion calendars,
on discovery, for example, by and large, 94% of these
cases settle with virtually no judicial time expended
on them. By contrast, this proposal requires the
expenditure of extensive judicial time, through a
nonjudicial process, in each and every case. This
is an expensive proposition.
Ques. #2B.

1.

Extensive costs would be incurred
in using the proposed prescreening
process.

The clerical tasks outlined in 2A. above are similar
in many respects to the administrative duties associated
with existing arbitration. An average of $25 per case
is the estimated cost of administering an arbitration
proceeding. AB 2919 involves some additional filing
and notice requirements not required in arbitration
proceedings plus start-up costs. Accordingly, $30
per case would seem to be a reasonable cost estimate.
To process an estimated 8000 claims per year against
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40,000 per

2.

A judge, in his
as an
, is to hear
all prehearing matters re
ve to discovery.
The
average time for each law and motion
related
to discovery, in personal injury cases, is estimated
at 9 to 13
With a j
and clerk
at the discovery
, the average cost is estimated
to be $15 to $22 per case.
Annual costs for this item,
based on an estimated 8000 claims per year, would total
$120,000 to $176,000 per year. This cost could be
substantially understated because of the limited and
vague standard for discovery under this proposal.

3.

A judge acts as an arbitrator during the hearing by
the three member panel.
The de
ion by the panel
is limited to determining the existence or absence
of liability.
In addition, the proposal provides
that "the findings of the panel" are to be admissible
at trial and are to be treated as expert testimony.
It is estimated, based on arbitration experience,
that a three member panel will require from one to two
hours per case to reach a decision on the existence
or absence of liability.
If "findings" are required,
2 1/2 hours would seem a more reasonable figure.
The costs of a judge and clerk, with necessary operating
supplies and a h
room would total $104 per
hour, per
th an estimated 8000 h
per year the total cost would be from $816,000 to
$1,632,000.
If "findings" were required the cost
would be $2,040,000 per annum.

4.

A judge participating in a panel cannot preside at
any subsequent hearings or trial of the same case.
This may result in assignment problems for some courts.
The cost of assigning a superior court judge to another
county
estimated to be $220 per day, including
per diem and travel.
If 6% of malpractice cases go
to trial and the average trial is two days, then the
annual cost would be $211,200 (6% x 8000 x 2 days x
$220).
If only one half of these cases required
an assigned judge (in other words, every 38th medical
malpractice case), the annual cost would be $105,600.

~

This California Department of Insurance figure,
based on 1979 statistics, is believed to be a conservative estimate of annual claims.
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Cost Summary
Administrative Costs
Discovery-prehearing
Hearing panel
Assignments

$

Estimated Annual Costs

$1,281,600 - $2,561,600

Ques. #2C.

240,000
120,000
816,000
105,600

- $ 240,000
176,000
2,040,000
105,600

The proposed screening process would not
appear to result in a more expeditious
handling of malpractice cases. To
the degree that a panel determination
on liability dissuades a potential
plaintiff from filing an action at
all, there could be fewer cases
actually filed but there is no bar
to the filing of an action whatever
the determination by the panel may
be. The basic reason that the proposed screening process would not
expedite the handling of malpractice
cases is specified in 2A. above.
The proposed nonjudicial system
duplicates, it does not replace,
much of the existing judicial system.
Accordingly, all of the normal processes
and procedures still have to be followed.

Ques. #2D. and 3.
Substantial additional burdens are
placed on the courts under the proposed
pretrial screening system and several of these
burdens raise signi cant constitutional
issues.
1.

Initially, this proposal requires the clerk of the court
to determine whether a pleading is a claim for damages,
whether it is against a physician and surgeon, and
whether it is based on a medical injury.
If it meets
these conditions, it can not be filed unless the claim
has been heard and decided by the screening panel. This
determination by the clerk requires the exercise of
discretion and is not a proper function for a clerk.
To make such a determination, a pleading would have to
be read, or scanned, and legal conclusions drawn as
to whether these specific conditions were met. This
type of duty requires training not possessed by clerks,
clearly exceeds a ministerial role, and could raise
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lity if an erroneous

2.

The imposition o£ nonjudicial duties on judges and
other judicial personnel is unconstitutional as a
violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
Article III, Section 3, California Constitution.
All of the additional duties imposed on the clerk and
on judges by this bill, are prefiling duties. As no
action has yet been filed to invoke the jurisdiction
of the court, arguably, all of these duties - establishment/administration of a nonjudicial prefiling system,
prehearingdiscovery, and panel hearings - are unconstitutional as they require the judicial branch of government
to engage in nonjudicial duties.

3.

This proposal gives unfair advantage to medical
malpractice cases.
Immediately upon the filing of a
request for a screening panel, the clerk and a judge
are required to perform a series of specified actions
ending with a determination by a three member panel
as to whether or not liability exists. Thus, without
regard to hundreds, perhaps, thousands of other backlogged
cases, the court is required to undertake this substantial nonjudicial activity at the expense of its existing
caseload. Whether this type of preferential treatment
rises to the level of a constitutional deprivation
is a matter for conjecture.
It certainly seems to
bestow a grossly unfair benefit on a select category
o£ cases by giving them, in essence, the benefit of
a prefiling advisory opinion.

4.

Conversely, an argument can be made that the imposition
of these additional procedural barriers to the filing
of one class of case only denies claimants with such
causes of action equal protection under the law.

•

Ques. #3.

Three additional points appear to
fall within the scope of question
#3.
First, this proposal, in
conjunction with the existing one
year statute of limitations for
personal injury and wrongful death
cases (CCP § 340) places substantial
time pressures on a claimant. This
proposal prohibits filing a medical
malpractice action without having
obtained a panel decision on liability.
The proposal does not toll the statute
while awaiting the panel's decision.
To get the requisite decision by the
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panel and still meet the one year
statute of limitations, a claimant
would have to file the request for
a screening panel almost immediately
after occurrence of the alleged
injury or death. That seems an
unreasonable burden to place on a
claimant. Secondly, discovery is
a time consuming process even when
diligently pursued. The time required
to complete even the limited discovery
authorized by this bill could take
3 to 6 months. Within the context
of a one year statute of limitations,
this proposal seems unworkable.
Finally, how realistic is it to
believe that doctors and lawyers are
going to sit, pro bono, on these
review panels? Under the existing
mandatory arbitration system, attorneyarbitrators are paid up to $150 per
day. This part of the proposal may
be totally unworkable.
Ques. #4.

The National Center for State Courts,
Western Regional Office, is currently
evaluating the effectiveness of the
Arizona statutes which provide for
a system of pretrial review of medical
malpractice cases. This evaluation,
undertaken at the request of the Arizona
Medical Association, should be completed
by the end of December 1980.
It
is worth noting however, that the
Arizona statute, which was passed in
1976, differs substantially from the
proposal embodied in AB 2919. Among
other differences, the Arizona statute:
1. Provides for a postfiling review
of medical malpractice actions;
2.
Provides state reimbursed compensation for the attorney and doctor
members of the review panel;
3. Operates within a judicial
structure that does not have mandatory
arbitration;
4. Preserves the same discovery
rights as otherwise exist under
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Arizona lawi and

5. Does not confer 11 expert testimony11 status on the findings of the
panel. A pane
' conclusion is to
be accorded such weight as the jury
chooses to give it.

•

I hope that these comments have been of some
assistance to you in considering AB 2919.
I will be available during your scheduled hearing for any questions the
committee may have.

Sincerely,
Ralph J. Gampell
Director

EAK:mmf
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September 10, 1980
Hon. Jack Fenton
6. Sections 1296.9 and 1297.1 require the screening panel to
decide upon the existence or absence of liability. The record of that
decision would thereafter be maintained by the County Clerk. Should the
record show the existence of 1i ability then the n:gul ar court process
would begin. However, if it is found there was no liability what would
become of the records? ~Jould th
kept indefinitely the same as court
records? Or could they be dis
of this work would be assumed by
7. Our final point is
the County Clerk thout
ement. It appears that some counties
would be required to add s
to just handle these matters. If it is
found that legislation is in cwder to establish this "pre-filing 11 process
required
help defray the expenses.
then it is essential that a fee
Sincerely,

.tL~.

J. A. Simpson, Ccunty Clerk-Recorder
Chairman, Legislative Cornmi
rts

County Clerks' Association
cc:

Bob Hamm, Pres.
Ed Kerry, Judicia 1

i
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Legal Issues Arising in the Use of Screening Panels
Proponents of medical screening panels claim that they are
a relatively inexpensive means of eliminating the spurious
claim at a pre-trial stage. However, the use of these
panels raises several
ex legal problems. Three major
issues have been faced by courts in states where panels
have been used:
·

A.

( 1)

Does the appl
ion of a special procedure to
medical malpractice claims interfere with an
individual's access to the courts in violation
of equal protect
of the law?

{2)

Does the vesting of a non~j
ial panel with
decision making authority violate constitutional
doctrines of separation of powers?

( 3)

Does the admission of the panel's decision in
a subsequent court proceeding unconstitutionally
1
impair a malpract e 1
s r
to a jury
trial?

Access to the Courts
There is no doubt that when a plaintiff is required
to submit a malpractice c im to a screening panel
as a condition precedent to filing suit, his or her
access to the courts
affected. The opponents
of screening
s c
im that panels add time and
expense to litigation, thereby abridging the individual's access to the court and right to a jury trial.
Critics of screening panels contend that both the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Federal
and State Constitutions are violated.
In considering these arguments, other jurisdictions
are split in the
conclusions.
The equal protection issue was argued before the Florida Supreme Court
in Carter v Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 u.s. 1041 (1977).
The court upheld the
ity of Florida's screening
panel procedure on
ground that
was a valid
exercise of the state's police powers. The court
recognized that
pre-litigation burden on the claimant
was severe but
that even though that burden
"reaches the outer limits of constitutional tolerance",
was a valid
attempt to
a
cri s.
(Also
see Comiskey v Ar
, 390 N.Y.S. 2d 122 [1976] .)
However, 1t should be noted that
1980 the Florida
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powers theory, courts have compared screening procedures to necessary pre-trial settlement efforts.
Further, these courts recognized that the panel's
decisions were opinions or advisory and not final
adjudications of the claims.
(See Carter v Sparkman
supra; Attorney General v Johnson, 385 Atl. 2d 57
(Md. 1978); State ex rel Strykowski v Wilkie, 261 N.W.
2d 934 [Wis. 1978].)
C.

Admission of the Panel's Decision in a Subsequent Trial
The statutes of nineteen states make some provision
for admitting a screening panel's decision into evidence in a subsequent court proceeding. Critics contend that when a screening panel's opinion is offered
into evidence at trial, the effect is to unfairly
influence the jury on the ultimate
sue of the case,
thereby denying litigants
r
to a jury trial.
Courts have recognized that one of the purposes of admitting a decision in a trial is to
e the jury
and thus discourage needless 1
medical
malpractice claims.
(See
85 Misc.
753, 756, 381 N.Y.S. 2d 74 ,
(1976T:T Nevertheless,
a number of state courts have upheld provisions which
authorize admiss
of the panel's decision in a subsequent trial. A number of courts have relied on the
theory that the jury rema
capable of determining
the ultimate questions of liability in spite of the
admission of the
's decision.
Even
Maryland, where the panel's decision is presumed to be correct upon admiss
, the State
Supreme Court upheld the validity of the state's
admission provisions. In Attorney General v Johnson,
supra, the Maryland Supreme Court neld:
This provision only establishes a rebuttable
presumption. It cuts off no defense, interposes no obstacle to a
1 contestation of
all the issues, and takes no question of fact
from either court or jury. At most, therefore,
is merely a rule of evidence. It
does not abridge the right of trial by jury,
or take away any of its incidents. Nor does
it in
work a denial of due process
of law:
In principle it is not unlike the
statutes
many of the states, whereby tax
deeds are made prima facie evidence of the
regularity of
the
s upon which
Such statutes
have been generally sustained [Citations
omitted.]
as have many
state and
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by the Committee on April
AB 2919 (Greene) was to be
9, 1980. At the request of the author,the bill was reOctober 14,
ferred to interim study at
In
an
effort to
· 1980 hearing will focus on
pos
and negasolicit testimony
rd
tive aspects of
e screenin~ panels,
to address the followCommittee staff
ing issues:
1.

What

ving medical malwould necessitate the
establishment of a unique screening procedure?
Do exis
court procedures fail to adequately
handle malpractice litigation?

2.

would the sc
of malpractice claims be a
more economical method of handling malpractice
cases? What costs would be involved in using a
pre-trial screening process? Would a screening
process result
a more
ious handling
of malpractice cases? What additional burden
is placed on the courts by pre-trial screening
panels?

3.

What legal issues are raised by establishing a
medical malpractice
ial screening process?

4.

What has been the experience in other states
where screening panels have been established?
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EXHIBIT B

AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY APRIL 8, 1980
CALIFORNIA

LEGISLATURE-1979~

REGULAR SESSION

ASSEMBLY BILL

No. 2919

Introduced by Assemblyman Greene
March 6, 1980

REFERRED TO COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY

An act to add Title 9.2 (commencing with Section 1296) to
Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, relating to health, and
making an appropriation therefor.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

AB 2919, as amended, Greene (Jud.). Malpractice
screening panels.
Under existing law, parties may voluntarily submit civil
disputes to arbitration. Additionally, existing law requires the
arbitration of certain claims in certain courts prior to trial.
This bill would require the pretrial submission of claims
against physicians and surgeons based on a medical injury to
a screening panel prior to filing a complaint. The panel would
be "'composed of a judge, an attorney, and a physician. The
panel's decision as to nonliability would be binding if a party
does not request te proceed file a complaint within 60 days,
in which case the decision would be admissible. The panel's
decision as to liability would be admissible at trial. The bill
would enact related provisions.
Section 2231 of the Revenue and Taxation Code requires
the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for
costs mandated by the state. The section also specifies the
manner for paying the reimbursement and requires any
-46-
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H~96.2. Ne e:lffiffi fer damages against a physician f:lftd
surgeon because ef a medical injury, ~.vhieh is filed en: et>
~ Jaauary -:1:-; t98.f.; ~.
~ ualess a SCreeaiag
~ htts heaFd f:lftd decided the e:lffiffi as provided ffi ~
#He: claim has been heard and decided by a screening
panel as provided by this title.
1296.2. (a) A person seeking to recover. damages
because of a medical injury shall file a request that a.
screening panel hear the claim for. damages with the
clerk of the superior court in which a complaint would
have been filed Such request shall generally state the
type and alleged cause ofinjuries, and shall set forth the
name and address ofthe physician and surgeon alleged to
be liable for the injuries.
(b) The clerk shall mail a copy of the request to the
physician and surgeon by registered ma11, return receipt
requested. Ifno receipt is returned, the clerk shall notifY
the complainant, who shall then give notice to the
physician and surgeon in the manner required for the
service of a summons. A screening panel shall not be
selected until the clerk has received a return receipt for
service by mail or proof ofservice /Tom the complainant.
(c) The physician and surgeon may file a response
setting forth why he or she is not liable to the
complainant.
(d) The clerk shall notify the parties of the procedures
relating to the screening panel.
1296.3. Within 60 days after a claim subject to this part
is filed, the presiding judge of the court, or such other
judge as is designated by the presiding judge, shall select
a screening panel composed of the following:
(a) That judge.
(b) An attorney selected by the judge from a list
submitted by a local bar assoGiation designated by the
judge.
(c) A physician and surgeon selected by the judge
from a list submitted by a local medical or medical
specialty society. Such physician and surgeon shall be a
recognized specialist or practitioner in the type of
practice involved in the action.

ee
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1
1296.4. The physician and surgeon and the attorney
2 members shall be persons willing to serve without
3 compensation, and shall not be compensated.
4
1296.5. The judge shall hear all prehearing matters
5 relating to discovery. It is the intent of the Legislature
6 that the hearing should be expeditious and relatively
7 informal, and therefore that discovery should be limited
8 to such matters as are probably necessary for the hearing.
9
1296.6. The hearing shall be scheduled as soon as
10 possible after the screening panel is formed.
11
1296.7. The judge shall have the powers of a neutral
12 arbitrator set forth in Sections 1282.2, 1282.6, and 1282.8,
13 and the provisions of such sections shall be applicable to
14 such hearing.
15
1296.8. The hearing need not be conducted according
16 to technical rules relating to evidence and witnesses. Any
17 relevant evidence shall be admitted if it is the sort of
18 evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed
19 to rely in the conduct of serious affairs, regardless of the
20 existence of any common law or statutory rule to the
21 contrary.
,
22
1296.9. The screening panel shall render a decision
23 within 10 days of the end of the hearing. The decision
24 shall be limited to the existence or absence of liability. A
25 dissent may be filed.
26
1297. If the screening panel determines that there is
27 no liability, that determination may be reviewed by filing
28 a: notice ~ a: ~ intends te pFoeeed wtM:t ffte. action
29 a complaint within 60 days after the decision is rendered.
30 If no notice i-s fHe6.; ffte decision ~ ee deemed
31 accepted a:n4 ffte. ee\:ift ~ eftfef' a: judgment ef
32 dismissaL complaint is filed within 60 days, any cause of
33 action against the physician and surgeon because of the
34 alleged injury shall be barred.
35
1997 .l. H' a: notice ef intent te pFoeeed wtM:t ffte. action
36
1297.1. Ifa complaint is filed, the findings of the panel
37 shall be admissible at trial and shall be treated as expert
38 testimony.
39
1297.2. If the screening panel determines that there is
40 liability, ~ action ~ pFoeeed as otherwise pFovided,
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liabilit~ a complaint may be filed within 60 days and the
findings of the ]:'anel shall be admissible at trial and shall
be treated as expert testimony.
1297.3. The judge who is a member of the screening
panel shall not preside at any subsequent hearing or trial
of the same case.
1297.4. No member of the screening panel shall be
liable for damages for any act or statement made as a
member of the panel.
1297.5. At any time before a panel is formed, a party
may move the ~judge designated pursuant to Section
1296.3 for a transfer of the case to another court as
otherwise provided by law.
SEC. 2. The sum of
dollars ($
) is
hereby appropriated from the General Fund to the
Controller for allocation and disbursement to local
agencies and school districts to reimburse them for costs
mandated by the state and incurred by them pursuant to
this act.

0
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CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE-1979-80 REGULAR SESSION

ASSEMBLY BILL

No. 2919

Introduced by Assemblyman Greene

March 6, 1980

REFERRED TO COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY

An act to add Title 9.2 (commencing with Section 1296) to
Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, relating to health, and
making an appropriation therefor.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

AB 2919, as introduced, Greene ( Jud.). Malpractice
screening panels.
Under existing law, parties may voluntarily submit civil
disputes to arbitration. Additionally, existing law requires the
arbitration of certain claims in certain courts prior to trial.
This bill would require the pretrial submission of claims
against physicians and surgeons based on a medical injury to
a screening panel. The panel would be composed of a judge,
an attorney, and a physician. The panel's decision as to
nonliability would be binding if a party does not request to
proceed within 60 days, in which case the decision would be
admissible. The panel's decision as to liability would be
admissible at trial. The bill would enact related provisions.
Section 2231 of the Revenue and Taxation Code requires
the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for
costs mandated by the state. The section also specifies the
manner for paying the reimbursement and requires any
statute mandating the costs to contain an appropriation to pay
for the costs in the initial fiscal year. This statutory provision
will be supplemented by a constitutional requirement of
-5199 40
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reimbursement effective for statutes enacted on or after July
l, 1980.
This bill appropriates an unspecified sum to the Controller
for allocation and disbursement to local agencies and school
districts for costs mandated by the state and incurred by them
pursuant to this act.
Vote: %. Appropriation: yes. Fiscal committee: yes.
State-mandated local
yes.

The people of the State of Califomi<l do enact as follows:
1
SECTION 1.
2 1296) is added to
3 to read:

9.2 (
3 of the Code of

with Section
Procedure,

4

5 TITLE 9.2. MALPRACTICE
PANELS
6
7
1296. In this title,
terms have the
8 meanings indicated,
the context of their use
9 requires otherwise:
10
(a) "Screening panel" means the panel selected
ll pursuant to Section 1296.3.
12
(b) "Court" means
court
the action is
pursuant to
13 filed or
1297.4.
14
(c)
or
arising or
to render health
resulting
16 care.
17
(d) "Physician and surgeon" means a physician and
18 surgeon licensed pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing
19 with Section 2000) of Division 2 of the Business and
20 Professions Code or
to
Osteopathic
21 Initiative
22
1296.1. No claim
damages
a physician and
23 surgeon because of a medical injury shall be filed in any
24 court in this state on or after January 1, 1981, unless the
25 plaintiff requests in
complaint that the
be heard
26 by a screening panel as
by
title.
27
1296.2. No claim for
against a physician and
28 surgeon because of a
injury, which is filed on or
29 after
l, 1981,
tried unless a screening
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1 panel has heard and decided the claim as provided in this
2 title.
3
1296.3. Within 60 days after a claim subject to this part
4 is filed, the presiding judge of the court, or such other

5 judge as is designated by the presiding judge, shall select
6 a screening panel composed of the following:
7
(a) That judge.
8
(b) An attorney selected by the judge from a list
9 submitted by a local bar association designated by the
10 judge.
11
(c) A physician and surgeon selected by the judge
12 from a list submitted by a local medical or medical
13 specialty society. Such physician and surgeon shall be a
14 recognized specialist or practitioner in the type of
15 practice involved in the action.
16
1296.4. The physician and surgeon and the attorney
17 members shall be persons willing to serve without
18 compensation, and shall not be compensated.
19
1296.5. The judge shall hear all prehearing matters
20 relating to discovery. It is the intent of the Legislature
21 that, the hearing should be expeditious and relatively
22 informal, and therefore that discovery should be limited
23 to such matters as are probably necessary for the hearing.
24
1296.6. The hearing shall be scheduled as soon as
25 possible after the screening panel is formed.
26
1296.7. The judge shall have the powers of a neutral
27 arbitrator set forth in Sections 1282.2, 1282.6, and 1282.8,
28 and the provisions of such sections shall be applicable to
29 such hearing.
30
1296.8. The hearing need not be conducted according
31 to technical rules relating to evidence and witnesses. Any
32 relevant evidence shall be admitted if it is the sort of
33 evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed
34 to rely in the conduct of serious affairs, regardless of the
35 existence of any common law or statutory rule to the
36 contrary.
37
1296.9. The screening panel shall render a decision
38 within 10 days of the end of the hearing. The decision
39 shall be limited to the existence or absence of liability. A
40 dissent may be filed.
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1297. If the screening panel determines that there is
no liability, that determination may be reviewed by filing
a notice that a party intends to proceed with the action
within 60 days after the decision is rendered. If no notice
is filed, the decision shall be deemed accepted and the
court shaH
1297.1. If a ..'-"'·""''"'
is filed,
findings
trial and shall be ~~" .."",""'""''~'~

1297.2.
11 liability, the action
12 and the findings
the panel

be admissible at trial
and shall be treated as expert testimony.
1297.3. The judge who is a
of the screening
panel shall not preside any
hearing or trial
of the same case.
1297.4. No member of the screening panel shall be
liable for damages for
act or statement made as a
member of the panel.
1297.5. At any time before a panel is formed, a party
may move the court for a
of the case to another
court as otherwise provided
law.
SEC. 2.
sum of
dollars ( $
) is
from the General Fund to the
allocation and
to local
26 agencies and school districts
reimburse them for costs
27 mandated by the state and incurred by them pursuant to
28 this act

13
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21
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24
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ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY

Prepared by
R. R. Lopez

JACK R. FENTON, CHAIRMAN

BILL DIGEST

BILL:

AB 2919
(As amended 4/8/80)

AUTHOR:

Greene

SUBJECT:

Malpractice Screening Panels

HEARING DATE: 4/9/80

OBJECTIVE:
This bill is intended to establish a mandatory pretrial
screening process to be used in all medical malpractice
death and injury actions against physicians and surgeons.
BILL DESCRIPTION:
Under existing law, parties may voluntarily submit civil
disputes to arbitration.
In addition, last year legislation went into effect which established an experimental
mandatory arbitration program for all civil cases in which
the amount in controversy is less than $15,000.
This bill would require that all medical injury claims for
damages against a physician and surgeon filed on or after
January ·1, 1981 be submitted to a screening panel prior to
trial. Specifically, the bill provides the following:
1.

No complaint for damages based on medical injury
against physician and surgeon shall be filed
after January 1, 1981 unless the claim has been
heard and decided by the screening panel as provided by this bill.

2.

A person seeking damages because of medical injury
shall be required to request that the claim be
heard by a screening panel. The bill also requires
that the clerk send the physician and surgeon a copy
of the filed request. No screening panel would be
selected until the clerk has received acknowledgment
or proof that the physician was served with the notice.
(CONTINUED)
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HEARING DATE:

4/9/80

3.

Within 60 days after the claim is filed, the
presiding judge or a designated judge shall
select a panel. The panel shall be composed of
the judge, an attorney from a list submitted by
a local bar, and a physician and surgeon from a
list submitted by a local medical society. The
attorney and physician shall serve without compensation.

4.

The judge shall hear all prehearing discovery
matters.
Although the hearing is intended to
be informal and technical rules of evidence
may not apply, the proceeding is to be conduc~ed
in a manner similar to existing statutory arb1tration proceedings. Further, the judge shal~
have the st.atutory authority of a neutral arb1trator.

5.

The panel shall render a decision limited to the
existence or absence of liability within 10 days
of a hearing. A finding of no liability shall
become final unless within 60 days of the decision,
a complaint based on the alleged injury or death
is filed.
If no complaint is filed, all subsequent claims are barred.

6.

The judge who sat on the panel would not be
eligible to hear the matter at trial.

The bill appropriates an unspecified sum from the General
Fund for the purposes of this measure.
SOURCE:
Author
SUPPORT:
Unknown
OPPOSITION:
California Trial Lawyers Association
Judicial Council
COMMENT:
1.

On July 1, 1979, a mandatory arbitration process for
all civil cases where the amount in controversy is
less than $15,000 went into effect. The Judicial
Council and the Auditor General are to review and
evaluate the effectiveness of that program. This
bill would establish a separate screening program for
(CONTINUED)
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handling malpractice claims against phys ians and
surgeons. Would it not be wise to evaluate the
existing arbitration process to determine if the
problems this bill seeks to resolve are adequately
handled by the existing process? Is it sound policy
to create a separate mandatory screening process for
cases involving only one group of professionals?
Further, since existing law requires mandatory arbitration of cases valued at less than $15,000 would
this bill not subject those cases to two separate
screening or arbitration systems? Should an amendment
be offered to prevent the same case from being subject
to two separate systems?

•
2.

This bill would require that the presiding judge or the judge's
designee sit on the medical malpractice screening panel.
It also prohibits that judge from hearing the case in
a subsequent judicial trial. Would this not cause
administrative problems for smaller courts with few
superior court judges? Further, the bill specifies
that the physician and attorney panel members shall not
be compensated. Is it practical to anticipate that members of these professions would be willing to volunteer
time to serve without compensation?

3.

This bill would require the screening of all medical
malpractice claims against physicians and surgeons.
It then defines physician and surgeon as one licensed
pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 2000)
of Division 2 of the Business and Professions Code or
pursuant to the Osteopathic Initiative Act. However,
Chapter 2 of Division 2 refers to ~hiropractors and
commences with Section 1000, while Chapter 5, Section
2000 deals with the Medical Practice Act.
It is unclear
what specific medical professions the author wishes to
cover in this bill.

4.

This bill would require the screening process include
an informal hearing which will be governed by some of
the statutory provisions dealing with arbitration
(Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1282.2, 1282.6 and
1282.8). However,the bill does not specifically guarantee that parties may be represented by counsel at these
hearings. Should the parties right to counsel at the
hearing be recognized?

s.

~is b~ll would.prohibit the filing of any complaint
1nvolv1ng a cla1m for damages against a physician and
surgeon because o~ a medical injury, unless the claim
was heard and dec1ded by a screening panel. Although

(CONTINUED)
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not specified by the bill, it is assumed that
the clerk would be required to reject a complaint which did not contain such a request.
Would this not exceed the ministerial responsibility of the clerk?
6.

The bill provides that the decision of the screening
panel would be admissible as expert testimony at any
subsequent court trial. The opponents of the bill
claim that to treat the panel's decision as expert
testimony would be highly prejudicial. Further, opponents claim that since the panel may ignore rules
of evidence, the admission of the decision may result
in "expert opinion" at trial which is based entirely
on inadmissible evidence.
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EXHIBIT C
'S STATUTES ESTABLISHING SCREENING PANELS
Alaska Stat. §09.55.536 (Supp. 1978)
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §12-567 (Supp. 1979)
Ark. Stat. Ann. §34-2603 (Supp. 1978)
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.

~38-196

(West Supp. 1979)

El. Code Ann. tit. 18 §6803 (Supp. 1978)
Fla. Stat. Ann. §768.44 (West Supp. 1979)
unconstitutional)

(Declared

Haw. Rev. Stat. §671-11 (1976)
Idaho Code §6-1001 (1979)
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110 §58.3 (Supp. 1979) Declared
unconstitutional)
Ind. Code §16-9.5-9-2 (1976)
Kan. Stat. Ann.

65-4901 (Supp. 1979)

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §40: 1299.47 (West 1977)
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 24 §2802 (Supp. 1979-80)
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §3-2A (Supp. 1979)
Mass. Gen. Law Ann. ch. 231, §608 (West Supp. 1979)
Mo. Ann. Stat. §538 020 (Vernon Supp. 1979)
unconstitutional)
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §17-1304

(Declared

(Supp. 1977)

Neb. Rev. Stat. §44-2840 (1978)
Nev. Rev. Stat. §41A.

020 (1977)

N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-5-14 (1978)
N.J. Civ. Prac. R. 4:21 (1979)
N.Y. Jud. Law §148-a (McKinney Supp. 1978-80)
N.D. Cent. Code §32-20.1-01 (Supp. 1979)
Ohio Rev. Code §2711-21 (Page Supp. 1978)
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, §1301.510 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80)
(Declared unconstitutional)
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-20THER STATE'S STATUTES ESTABLISHING SCREENING PANELS (Continued)
Rhode Island

R.I. Gen. Laws §10-19-8

Tennessee

Tenn. Code Ann. §23-3409 (Supp. 1979)

Virginia

va. Code §8.01-581.8 (Supp. 1979)

Wisconsin

Wis. Stat. Ann. §655.19 (l),
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(Supp. 1978)

(2)

(West Supp. 1979)

